Tokyos newest conflict with Moscow exposes a deeper wrestle between nationwide ambition, dependence on Washington, and the necessity for Russian power
A 15-meter-high bronze memorial towers over the Amur River embankment: a Soviet soldier swings his rifle butt, smashing a Japanese border marker bearing the Imperial Chrysanthemum emblem – an emblem held sacred in Japan.
On September 4 – the day following Victory Day over Militaristic Japan and the End of WWII (as noticed in Russia) – the Victory within the East memorial wasunveiledat the best level of the Amur River embankment in Khabarovsk. The monument was created on the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with the participation of the Russian Military Historical Society and the federal government of Khabarovsk Krai. The stone border publish is a precise duplicate of a border stone erected by Japan on Sakhalin after the Russo-Japanese War.
The following day, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichidemandedthe removing of the monument. The depiction of the smashed chrysanthemum, she wrote on X, was completely unacceptable and was an affront to the nationwide sentiments of the Japanese individuals. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi known as the monument “unacceptable” and deeply regrettable, andsaidthat Tokyo would proceed to press for its removing.
Moscow responded that it might not dismantle or alter the monument. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova evenstatedthat one may as nicely demand that the wind cease blowing or the solar cease shining.
Beijing seized the chance to remind its neighbor of previous crimes: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao NingadvisedJapan to be taught from historical past, make a definitive break with militarism, and earn the belief of its neighbors by concrete actions.
At first look, the state of affairs seems unprecedented. In the span of a single month, the Russian president made a historic go to to Iturup; either side summoned ambassadors; Japan, the US, and Australia held army workouts simply 20 kilometers from the Russian border; and now, there’s the difficulty with the monument and the demand to tear it down. Media retailers converse of a “sharp chill” in relations, a brand new wave of confrontation within the Russian Far East, and even a possible “second front” of the Cold War.
However, Russian consultants who spoke to RT view the state of affairs in a different way.
A collection of coincidences
The state of affairs was triggered not by Russia’s actions, however by the Japanese Ministry of Defense.
On August 4, the Cabinet of Japan authorized its annualDefense of Japan White Paper- a record-breaking 598 pages that includes an anime-style cowl exhibiting a bunch of smiling younger individuals in opposition to the backdrop of a futuristic metropolis. This yr’s theme was “Security for the Future.” The content material of the whitepaper was fairly pragmatic, nonetheless.Chinawas recognized as Japan’s best strategic problem; on this checklist, China was adopted by Russia and North Korea; for the primary time, the buildup of army energy was straight linked to financial prosperity (therefore the peaceable cowl design).
JapanMinistryofDefense
There is a piece on Russian militaryactivityin the Far East: the doc notes Tu-95 flights, 214 interceptions of Russian plane over the course of the yr, the growth of joint naval patrols with China (in August 2025, a submarine participated in these patrols for the primary time), in addition to a flight by Russian and Chinese bombers to the realm close to Shikoku Island in December. There can be a chapter on new strategies of warfare, comparable to using mass-produced, low-cost drones and AI in decision-making. For the second consecutive yr, the doc characterizes Russian army actions within the Southern Kuril Islands as “illegal occupation.”
Nine days later, on August 13, Vladimir PutinvisitedIturup. Throughout his years in workplace, the Russian president had by no means visited the southern islands of the Kuril chain, that are additionally claimed by Japan.
Japan’s response was quick. Takaichi known as the go to “absolutely unacceptable,” Motegi repeated Tokyo’s place concerning the islands being an “inherent part of Japanese territory,” and the Japanese Foreign MinistrysummonedRussian Ambassador to Japan Nikolay Nozdrev. Moscow responded firmly, dismissing the statements of Japanese officers as politicallyirrelevant,offensive, and legally null and void; it reiterated that Iturup, like the remainder of the Kurils, is an integral a part of Russia, and that Japanese officers haven’t any proper to inform Moscow which areas of the nation the Russian president might go to.
On August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s give up in WWII, Takaichisenta ‘tamagushi’ (ritual providing) to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, she avoided going there personally, and the ruling partyclarifiedthat the donation was constituted of private funds and in Takaichi’s capability as LDP chief, fairly than as head of presidency. The gesture was calculated to fulfill the home viewers, with out triggering a diplomatic row with Beijing and Seoul.
On August 18, Japanese Ambassador to Russia Akira Muto was summoned to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzinlodged a powerful protestregarding statements made by the Japanese prime minister and overseas minister, asserting that Russia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Southern Kuril Islands are inviolable, and that any makes an attempt to name this actuality into query are unacceptable and illegitimate.
On August 31, one other incident occurred, this time involving army workouts. From September 8-24, Japan, the US, and Australia performed Exercises Orient Shield with some operations going down on Hokkaido Island, close to the Russian border. The Japanese facet wasinformedthat provocative army exercise close to Russia’s Far Eastern borders is completely unacceptable; Zakharova specificallynotedplans to deploy US land-based Typhon missile programs – able to firing medium-and shorter-range missiles – through the workouts and warned of compensatory countermeasures.
A brand new monument to the Soviet victory over Japan in World War II, devoted in Khabarovsk as a part of the Russian-Chinese Forum on September 4, 2026.
Sputnik / Ekaterina Chesnokova
On September 4, the monument was unveiled in Khabarovsk. That identical day, the UN General Assembly voted to undertake the Equal Earth Projection. Japan voted in favor. But just a few days later, it demanded acorrection: on the web model of the brand new map, the 4 Southern Kuril Islands have been shaded the identical shade as the remainder of Russia, which Japan discovered unacceptable.
So there we have now it – six incidents in 30 days. Each incident compounds the earlier one, and collectively they kind an image of quickly deteriorating relations.
Below, Russian consultants analyze the state of affairs.
‘Relations haven’t cooled out of the blue’
Vasily Shchepkin – a Japanologist with a PhD in History, senior researcher of the Far East Department on the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an affiliate professor on the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg – suggests reframing the query.
“In my view, relations between Russia and Japan have not cooled suddenly; they have been in this state for over four years, since the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. Japan joined Western sanctions, and everything that has happened over the past four years is largely a consequence of that,” he mentioned.
Therefore, the rift occurred not in September 2026, however in March 2022 – when Tokyo backed the collective West’s sanctions regime, and Moscow responded bywithdrawingfrom peace treaty negotiations, cancelling visa-free journey for Japanese residents to the Kuril Islands, and halting dialogue on joint financial exercise there. Everything that adopted was the consequence of that single choice.
So, what occurred in August? According to Shchepkin, the present chain of occasions was a direct results of Putin’s go to to Iturup. Tokyo’s response was inevitable. However, he attracts consideration to a uncared for element. “Aside from statements, no concrete measures have followed so far.”
No actions have been undertaken by Japan in September. No new sanctions packages have been adopted; diplomats weren’t expelled, and the remaining initiatives weren’t cancelled. As for demarches, the summoning of diplomats, and declarations of unacceptable habits, all that is normal diplomatic process.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the founding father of the Gidrostroy group of corporations, Alexander Verkhovsky, go to the Yasny fish processing advanced on Iturup Island, Sakhalin Region, Russia on August 13, 2026.
Sputnik / Gavriil Grigorov
“Neither Tokyo nor Moscow seeks to aggravate relations further,” Shchepkin says. “In my view, [relations] are unlikely to deteriorate further, because, speaking of bilateral interaction, neither side wants to halt it or escalate tensions.”
Therefore, we might conclude that Russia-Japan relations, of their present kind, are a dependent variable.
“The current state of relations is rather a consequence of other events, which are not directly tied to the Russian-Japanese agenda,” the knowledgeable says.
An unbiased bilateral agenda not exists; due to this fact, we might solely converse of the worldwide state of affairs and the way it pertains to Russia’s Far East.
“We are currently in a sort of deadlock which we return to whenever the global situation gets worse – and particularly when relations between Russia and the US deteriorate,” the knowledgeable says. “The US has long been the ‘third force’ on which Russia-Japan relations largely depended.”
Who began it?
While it is true that relations are frozen, there is no such thing as a consensus among the many events on who’s accountable for this. Russian consultants, nonetheless, have a transparent opinion.
Olga Bonch-Osmolovskaya, a Japanologist with a PhD in History, describes the explanations behind Tokyo’s choice. According to her, after 2022, Japan’s coverage ceased to be actually unbiased. But that’s solely a part of the story.
“It is one thing to politically condemn a distant war and state one’s position for the sake of appearances, given the existence of a sort of ‘suzerain’; it is quite another to actively integrate oneself into the corresponding policy,” she says. Japan selected the latter possibility. And it did so with explicit zeal.
“Driven by what one might call the ‘straight-A student complex’ of the Japanese and their tendency to be highly conscientious, sometimes even fanatical in executing tasks, Japan closely aligned itself with this course, joining the full package of sanctions against Moscow and withdrawing from various forms of cooperation,” Bonch-Osmolovskaya says.
Service members of the Australian Army, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, US Army take part within the closing ceremony for Exercise Orient Shield ’26 in Hokkaido, Japan, on September 24, 2026.
Legion-Media / Alamy / piemags / news
The former coverage – one which allowed Tokyo to steadiness between allied obligations and its personal pursuits within the north – was curtailed. Along with it, all of the achievements of the earlier decade got here to naught.
“Russia did not initiate the deterioration of relations with Japan,” Bonch-Osmolovskaya says. “It responded and continues to respond to Japanese sanctions and to the increased US military presence.”
There is a nice line between phrases and capabilities, nonetheless. Take Exercises Orient Shield, for instance. “During the exercises, all sorts of maneuvers are practiced – the landing of troops, the transfer of ammunition, the deployment of HIMARS systems, air defense systems, etc.”
This explains Russia’s robust response. “Of course, no one is saying that this is literally preparation for an attack on the Kuril Islands. But Russia is obliged to evaluate not only statements, but military capabilities,” Bonch-Osmolovskaya says.
Intentions change together with governments, however army infrastructure stays. And army officers everywhere in the world take this into consideration.
The result’s a vicious circle: Japan builds up its army potential collectively with the US; in response, Russia strengthens its place within the Far East; then, Tokyo presents this strengthening as a further justification for additional militarization. And the circle repeats itself.
This is confirmed by Japan’s army spending. Japan crossed the two% protection spending threshold forward ofschedule, a yr sooner than the mark outlined within the 2022 technique. For the present fiscal yr, protection spending amounted to arecord8.8 trillion yen, and the request for the subsequent yr is already arecord8.9 trillion yen (about $56 billion). In June, the parliamentrenamedthe Air Self-Defense Force into the Air and Space Self-Defense Force; this was the primary renaming of one of many three branches of the Self-Defense Forces since their creation in 1954. In August, Takaichiannouncedfurther adjustments: the creation of a Space Operations Group, a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) satellite tv for pc, and the growth of the Okinawa Ground Self-Defense Force’s fifteenth Brigade right into a division.
These actions are primarily directed in opposition to Beijing. But contemplating the geography, they’re additionally directed in opposition to Moscow.
The 1st Airborne Brigade of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces conducts coaching on January 12, 2025, at Camp Narashino in Chiba Prefecture, Japan.
David Mareuil / Anadolu through Getty Images
Energy as an alternative of diplomacy
Despite all this, there’s something that balances the dramatic image. While diplomats are exchanging demarches, gasoline carriers are departing from Sakhalin and transporting LNG to Japan.
The Sakhalin-2 mission survived sanctions, frozen political dialogue, and calls for to dismantle the monument. In June, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control as soon as againextendedthe particular license till December 18, 2026. Such an exception has been issued yearly since 2022, and every time it was preceded by negotiations between Tokyo and Washington. Russian LNG,accordingto the Japanese Ministry of Economy, supplied about 9% of Japanese liquefied gasoline imports in 2025; According to Bonch-Osmolovskaya, the inverse relationship is even stronger – Japan accounted for about 58% of the mission’s exports.
Vladimir Nelidov – PhD in History, affiliate professor of the Department of Oriental Studies at MGIMO, Senior Researcher on the Center for Japanese Studies on the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and RIAC knowledgeable – considers this to be the principle purpose why the threats did not transcend phrases.
“Severing diplomatic relations would be disproportionate,” he says. “The possibilities for introducing additional economic sanctions are also limited: Japan does not have much leverage. For example, it remains involved in Sakhalin oil and gas projects and, I believe, is not ready to sacrifice them.”
Notably, the US administration insisted on Japan’s withdrawal from the Sakhalin initiatives. However, Tokyo remained. “As far as we can judge, Takaichi either convinced the US or insisted [on doing things her way] and so, despite the position of its senior ally, Japan remained in the projects.”
The second attainable lever is humanitarian. Tokyo tries to protect it, too. “The Japanese side has invested a lot of effort in humanitarian cooperation with Russia. Before the current escalation, the Japanese even proudly said that, despite the lack of political dialogue, cultural festivals and other events continue between the countries.” And Nelidov provides, “in the long term, Japan has perhaps more need for such contacts than Russia.”
Shchepkin helps this concept, including that even up to now 4 years, and due to the efforts of the pro-Russia foyer inside the Japanese Foreign Ministry, cooperation has been preserved in areas like tradition, schooling, and tourism. The present stream of Russian vacationers to Japan, the knowledgeable provides, is essentially a legacy of the Shinzo Abe administration, when the events agreed to place the territorial challenge apart and give attention to the financial system, tradition, and visas.
A composite picture reveals Vasily Shchepkin, Olga Bonch-Osmolovskaya, and Vladimir Nelidov.
The common image is sort of clear. Bonch-Osmolovskaya calls it “cold peace” and warns {that a} full rupture of relations wouldn’t profit both nation: whereas Japan may technically change Sakhalin gasoline, doing so would require time, cash, and even better dependence on US suppliers, whereas Russia would lose income from the mission. “A definitive break, should it occur, would come at too high a price for both sides,” she says.
Therefore, the restrict to how far relations can deteriorate will not be decided by diplomacy. It is dictated by the power steadiness, and this is applicable to each events.
Why Takaichi couldn’t stay silent
A urgent query stays: why did the Japanese Prime Minister challenge all these loud statements if no concrete measures have been to comply with?
Nelidov suggests viewing the state of affairs by the eyes of the Japanese management to raised perceive their logic. Sanae Takaichi rose to energy as a nationalist politician and, amongst different issues, a defender of nationwide honor. Her coverage is grounded on this.
“Had she failed to react to the Russian president’s visit to the territory claimed by Japan, to the installation of the monument – which [Russia] views as fine, necessary, and valuable, but which the Japanese see as a desecration of a state symbol – or to the military exercises, she would have been torn apart, figuratively speaking, by her own party,” the knowledgeable says.
For instance, when the US administration imposedsanctionsagainst the International Criminal Court – together with its presiding decide, Japanese nationwide Tomoko Akane – Takaichi confronted criticism for not standing up for her compatriot firmly sufficient. “If public opinion and fellow party members demand decisive action from her even in dealings with the US, then what would they say about Russia?”
A situation by which Tokyo would have remained silent to keep away from damaging relations with Moscow is just about unattainable.
Valery Kistanov, head of the Center for Japanese Studies on the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, drew consideration to thedetailsof the protest in opposition to the monument in Khabarovsk. Takaichi posted her touch upon social media however didn’t challenge an official assertion, and main Japanese media retailers (aside from right-wing conservative publications) barely lined the story. It did not trigger a nationwide outcry.
Sanae Takaichi, the then newly-elected chief of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), attends a press convention on October 4, 2025 in Tokyo, Japan.
Yuichi Yamazaki – Pool / Getty Images
In different phrases, the assertion was addressed to not Moscow, however to fellow occasion members and the section of the Japanese citizens for whom the occasions of 1945 stay a permanent historic wound. The providing made at Yasukuni on August 15 adopted the identical logic: constituted of private funds and with out Takaichi herself current, it was supposed as a sign to the home viewers, however was rigorously calibrated to keep away from scary a brand new disaster in relations with Beijing.
The indisputable fact that the collection of incidents was not adopted by any sensible actions holds the important thing to understanding the occasions of September. This signifies that a big a part of what occurred didn’t concern bilateral relations however was supposed for home audiences.
However, this doesn’t render the state of affairs completely innocent. Symbolic commitments are inclined to turn into entrenched: a primary minister who has demanded the dismantling of a monument can’t refute their very own assertion, and a successor must begin from the identical place.
Who advantages?
Experts agree on who advantages from the battle, although they differ on the implications. “It is clear that the US is the primary beneficiary,” says Bonch-Osmolovskaya. “The worse relations between Moscow and Tokyo become, the stronger Japan’s existing dependence on the US grows in all aspects: weaponry, intelligence, supplies, and security guarantees.” Washington features a disciplined ally, extra bases for the deployment of forces, and one other software for exerting stress on the Russian Far East.
However, she provides, “It is important not to reduce the situation to a scenario where the US is some sort of ‘dark empire’ and Japan is merely its puppet.”
In Japan, there are particular beneficiaries of this confrontation as nicely. Among the proponents of revising post-war restrictions is the protection institution, which Bonch-Osmolovskaya characterizes as revanchist and nationalistic, and arms producers, for whomexpandedexports open up markets that had been closed for practically 80 years. The picture of an exterior risk serves as a mechanism for legitimization: the longer the checklist of threats, the better it’s for the parliament to extend army spending and carry export restrictions.
Bonch-Osmolovskaya offers a fairly harsh evaluation and makes a historic analogy. She believes that the present propaganda is paying homage to the many years previous WWII, when Japan designated China as its main adversary and demonized it; right this moment, an identical course of is unfolding relating to Russia. At the foundation of this, she sees the unresolved trauma of 1945: whereas the cult of the emperor was formally dismantled and the atrocities of the army machine have been acknowledged, the defeat was by no means actually accepted, and strategic sovereignty was misplaced.
People collect to have a good time Japanese Emperor Naruhito’s 66th birthday on the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Japan on February 23, 2026.
David Mareuil / Anadolu through Getty Images
Nelidov takes a extra measured method, providing a distinct view that doesn’t recommend malicious intent. The drawback, he believes, is the so-called ‘safety dilemma’ – a long-standing idea in worldwide relations principle. A state strengthens its defenses; its neighbors, unaware of its true intentions, interpret this as preparation for aggression and arm themselves in response; the primary state observes these preparations and continues its army buildup. “The paradox of the security dilemma is that in seeking to protect itself, the state ultimately finds itself in an even more dangerous situation,” he explains.
Another issue additionally comes into play. “Most Japanese diplomats, politicians, and even military officials have no desire to develop an independent view of the global situation,” Nelidov says, describing Japanese political circles as extremely compliant pupils of the West; the few who acknowledge that the state of affairs in Ukraine is perhaps extra advanced than the prevailing narrative threat turning into outcasts. These sentiments didn’t emerge in 2022; they have been formed all through the post-war interval by the media and the schooling system, initially as anti-Soviet views. In Japanese opinion polls, Russia persistently ranks low by way of public favorability, alongside China and North Korea.
Freezing level
If the present state of affairs resembles ‘freezing level’, it’s logical to ask what may drive the relations between Japan and Russia under freezing.
Bonch-Osmolovskaya mentions a particular threshold. “The next stage of deterioration could be the deployment of US long-range systems in Japan,” she says. Russia’s response could be predictable: an additional army buildup on the Kuril Islands and in Sakhalin. An extra contraction of financial ties can be probably; she believes that the fishing business would endure first, adopted by what stays of commerce.
Bonch-Osmolovskaya doesn’t predict a direct army battle. According to her, if it have been to happen in any respect, it might occur solely as half of a bigger conflict between Russia and the US or a serious disaster surrounding Taiwan that dragged in all of the neighboring states. In different phrases, a Russo-Japanese struggle is unattainable as a standalone occasion – it may solely be an episode inside another person’s struggle.
Nelidov views the state of affairs considerably in a different way. He factors out that Japan’s protection coverage identifies China and North Korea as the first threats, with Russia rating third on the checklist. But even on the subject of China and North Korea, it is not about direct confrontation however fairly an arms race. While that is definitely a unfavourable phenomenon, it’s basically totally different from a direct battle.
The comparability the knowledgeable attracts with Europe is attention-grabbing. He considers the rhetoric of Berlin, London, Helsinki, and Stockholm way more threatening than that of Tokyo, which demonstrates “virtually no real readiness for aggressive action against Russia.” He is satisfied there are particular limits the Japanese facet is not going to cross.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz greets Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on the G20 Summit on November 22, 2025 in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Leon Neal / Getty Images
He attributes East Asia’s better reluctance to interact in direct battle to amassed expertise: territorial disputes and mutual historic grievances are widespread within the area, and the elites have realized to handle such crises. For instance, following Takaichi’sNovember statementregarding potential intervention in Taiwan, Tokyo’s relations with Beijing plummeted to their lowest level in a decade, and Chinaimposedeconomic restrictions; but inside just a few months, the state of affairs had stabilized.
“In East Asia, I don’t see the kind of crazy Russophobia and readiness to direct all resources into the conflict that we’re witnessing in Europe,” says Nelidov. “Japan doesn’t intend to go to war with Russia; and neither does Russia want war with Japan. Both sides realize it is not in their interests. There are no strategically vital or fundamental contradictions between them.”
Is there a approach to obtain a thaw in relations? All three consultants agree that there is no such thing as a easy resolution. Normalizing bilateral ties is unattainable till relations between Russia and the West are normalized; the Japanese management lacks each the need and the capability to undertake an unbiased stance. However, Shchepkin believes that after the battle in Ukraine ends, Tokyo might be among the many first to behave: as quickly because the sanctions regime is lifted or minimized, Japan might be prepared to melt its place and resume dialogue.
However, the opinions of consultants diverge on the subject of assessing the present pause in relations. For Nelidov, it’s merely one other fluctuation in a protracted historical past of regional squabbles. For Bonch-Osmolovskaya, it represents a deeper rift: Russia is asserting itself as an unbiased civilization, whereas Japan, in response, is turning into more and more built-in into the US system of management over Eurasia. She advocates neither for reconciliation at any value nor for territorial concessions, however fairly for sustaining power, financial, and cultural ties as a bridge – “not so much with the Japan of today, but with the Japan that might one day become more independent.”
As Bonch-Osmolovskaya concludes, “Japan cannot simultaneously be an independent civilization and America’s forward military outpost. It will have to make a choice.”
(RT.com)