Since 7 October 2023, theAustralian Governmenthas constantly maintained that itdoes”not provide weapons to Israel”.However, that declare depends on a slender authorized framing a technical reality that obscures a extra worrying actuality, writesTyson Parker.
THE LINE between the place Australian sovereignty ends and allied/contractor logistical management begins has blurred. Through the mechanisms of theF-35supply chain, Israel can draw from a pooled sustainment system that’s constantly fed byover 70Australian firms, with out Australia needing to approve the exports or present parts straight.
Through worldwide agreements, legislative amendments, provider contracts and pooled logistics, Australia has agrowing rolein this system, withevery F-35built containing Australian-made parts.
On 5 June 2024, the Department of Defence supplied the clearest articulation of the executive actuality.
When pressed on whether or not Australian-made parts within the world F-35 pool have been being utilized by the Israel Defence Forces, Department of Defence Deputy SecretaryHugh Jeffrey said:
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Declassified Australiadocumented 68 shipments of Australian-made F-35 parts, despatched to Israel between October 2023 and September 2025, with 51 addressed to Nevatim airbase, dwelling of Israels F-35 squadrons.
InOctober 2025, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee heard questions on reviews that F-35 parts have been shipped from Australia to Israel in the course of the warfare in Gaza.
Responding to Declassified Australias article, Jeffreysaid, the Australian Government doesn’t have any direct relationship with the Israeli Government on the F-35 program”.
A close examination of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program does suggest that the Australian Governments position is accurate, although only due to outsourcing control of component exports.
Unlike traditional arms sales, where a manufacturer sells a tank or rifle to another country, the F-35 operates under a Global Support Solution (GSS).
Under the ‘Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development(PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding’, the relationship is legally asymmetrical.
While the U.S. is required to conduct ‘prior consultation’ with partners before transferring parts to a third party, Australia (or any other country) is contractually barred from transferring F-35 components, without the prior written consent of the U.S. Government (sections 13.1 and 13.2 of the PSFD).
Effectively, this grants Washington a veto over Australian supply decisions.
Even if Canberra wanted to supply parts directly to Israel, it would require explicit U.S. permission to do so.
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Conversely, if the U.S. decides to redistribute Australian-made parts, Australia has limited legal power to override that decision, aside from being consulted.
In 2024, as a result of the AUKUS agreement, another mechanism was introduced, further restricting Australian officials ability to assess and determine exports.
TheDefence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024, designed to facilitate the AUKUS alliance, creates a permit-free environment for shipments to the USA and UK.
Under these amendments, the requirement for individual export permits for goods sent to the U.S. global pool has largely vanished.
The human rights assessment trigger contained in Regulation 13E of theCustoms (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958which requires certain exports to be assessed for the risk of facilitating serious human rights abuses does not appear to apply in the same way to transfers within the AUKUS licence-free environment.
Although exporters must still report specifics on shipments, this is more of a notification rather than an approval process and despite requirements to provide information on an initial destination, theres no obligation to report a final end-point.
This is an intentional policy decision made by the Australian Government and as a result, Australian-made F-35 components can flow into the U.S. inventory without ministerial oversight or sign-off.
It is explicitly stated in the2025-29 Defence Corporate Planthat Defence aims to significantly reduce the number of export permits to the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, facilitated via the AUKUS Licence-Free environment in order to lessen regulatory burden.
This has enabledthe elimination of around 900 export permits required under the previous export controls from Australia to the United States and United Kingdom as of 1 September 2024.
AnAuditor-General Report (2018-19)explicitly states that participation in the F-35 global pool involves [U.S.] Government ownership of spares and centralised supply chain management’.
(Image source:Department of Defence)
This means that the moment a component, such as aweapon adaptorproduced by Ferra Engineering orweapons bay systemsfrom Rosebank Engineering, enters the supply chain, it ceases to be Australian-owned or controlled.
Components are then shipped from Australian manufacturers to regional warehouses across the globe (including one located at Williamtown, New South Wales).
This system essentially ends many of Australias legal obligations at hand-off to the U.S., either at the gates of Williamtown or upon shipment to another global depot in the Netherlands or USA.
Components in the U.S. inventory are primarily managed by a computerised logistics system (ALIS, transitioning toODIN) that distributes parts based on global operational priority, which remainU.S. property until installed on an aircraft.
This system creates further complexity in blocking supplies destined for Israel exclusively.
For Australia to effectively prevent parts going to Israel, components would need to be blocked from entering the global supply pool entirely.
This would impact all participants in the program collectively, including regional partners such as Japan and South Korea.
This reality was outlined most explicitly in aU.K. High Court judgment(Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade) delivered in mid-2025.
The Court accepted evidence from Keith Bethell, Director General Air within the Ministry of Defence, that the system is …simply not designed to enable any of the Participants to make unilateral decisions in relation to altering the organisation and structure of the program’.
Mr Bethell also stated that the only way for the UK to ensure that its components do not reach Israel is for it to suspend all exports into the F-35 program, which is consistent for all participant countries.
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The case additionally acknowledged that:
For companions within the F-35 program, denying particular person parts to particular end-users is extraordinarily troublesome, if not successfully unattainable.
Theres an additional implication for Australia that has a extra direct influence.
Under the present system, Australia may simply be left with out vital parts to maintain its personal fleet operational, if the U.S. decides to prioritise provide to different international locations (together with itselfand Israel).
This danger is compounded by persistent spare-parts shortages and sustainment shortfalls documented inAustralian,UKandU.S.audit reporting.
The F-35 program has successfully established a precedent the place industrial integration throughout the U.S. military-industrial advanced can restrict impartial export management and sovereign decision-making.
It raises severe questions on what visibility and leverage Australia retains over Australian-made parts as soon as they enter the F-35 sustainment system and simply how a lot this impacts our personal defence capabilities.
Tyson Parkeris a contract journalist, photographer and researcher based mostly in South-East Queensland.
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