Viewing overseas coverage from a perspective oriented towards peace naturally attracts consideration to army buildup and rising tensions. But what emerges if, not less than initially, we set that judgment apart and look coolly at what worldwide media see or concern within the overseas coverage of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi?
When she took workplace in October 2025, the dominant portrait of Takaichi was simple: political inheritor to Shinzo Abe, conservative, a safety “hawk”, robust on China and supportive of constitutional revision. Her ties with Taiwan and visits to Yasukuni Shrine have been additionally repeatedly famous. The shrine honors Japan’s struggle lifeless, together with 14 Class-A struggle criminals, and is subsequently deeply controversial in China and South Korea.[1]
Almost a yr later, the query has shifted: not solely “Is Takaichi a hawk?”, however “How does she act in diplomatic practice?”
United States – A dependable ally, however how autonomous?
From Washington, the centrality of the alliance stands out first. With Donald Trump, Takaichi has drawn on Abe’s legacy, combining private diplomacy, funding, vital minerals and protection.[2] For the U.S. safety institution, a Japan extra actively engaged in deterrence towards China is a fascinating ally.
The Financial Times has highlighted the opposite aspect of the coin: confronted with Trump’s unpredictability, Tokyo has no actual “Plan B”.[3] Nor does Takaichi mechanically settle for each U.S. request. On the Strait of Hormuz, the federal government cited authorized limits on the usage of the Self-Defense Forces and prioritized diplomacy.[4] How a lot autonomous room can Japan create inside an alliance that continues to be indispensable?
Europe – What is Japan turning into?
In main European media, Japan’s protection buildup can be learn as a change of its postwar identification. Le Monde has centered on Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, the “pacifist clause” by which Japan renounces struggle and restricts the usage of power.[5]
Arms exports, counterstrike capabilities, constitutional revision and debate over the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” – not possessing, producing or allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons – increase a broader query: as Japan grows militarily stronger, what does it retain of the postwar Japan?[6]
Australia – Toward a extra autonomous regional function?
In May 2026, Takaichi described the connection with Canberra as a “quasi-alliance”, increasing cooperation in protection, vitality, vital minerals and financial safety.[7] ABC highlighted a shared dilemma: persevering with to depend on the United States whereas decreasing the danger of relying on Washington alone.[8]
A denser community with Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, India and Southeast Asia may widen Tokyo’s room for maneuver. It continues to be too early, nonetheless, to talk of strategic autonomy.
South Korea – Separating historical past from cooperation
In South Korea, preliminary expectations have been detrimental. The background included Yasukuni, Japanese colonial rule, the difficulty of the “comfort women” – ladies, lots of them Korean, who have been coerced into Japan’s army brothel system – and that of Korean laborers mobilized throughout colonial rule.
Relations with President Lee Jae-myung have nonetheless proved extra steady than anticipated. The two leaders have intensified conferences and cooperation on vitality, vital minerals, provide chains, North Korea and coordination with the United States.[9]
Takaichi has not modified her view of historical past. The query is whether or not she will separate ideological convictions from the day-to-day administration of relations between states. The historic disputes stay unresolved; the sturdiness of this pragmatism will likely be an necessary check.
China – Before managing the battle comes the “political foundation”
A caveat is required when studying mainland Chinese media: Xinhua, CGTN, China Daily and Global Times are a lot nearer to the official positions of the federal government and the Communist Party than main Western newspapers. They subsequently primarily present China’s public and semi-official picture of Takaichi’s overseas coverage.
Takaichi’s November 2025 remarks {that a} battle over Taiwan may represent a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan are offered as the basic reason for the deterioration. Beijing argues that they undermine the “political foundation” set by the 4 fundamental political paperwork governing China-Japan relations because the 1972 Joint Communique.[10]
China Daily hyperlinks these remarks to Japan’s army buildup, arms exports and the security-cooperation community being constructed by Tokyo, accusing the federal government of talking of “stable relations” whereas transferring in the wrong way.[11]
Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post provides a special component: Chinese stress has not essentially weakened Takaichi, and Beijing has struggled to rally Asian international locations in opposition to Japan.[12] China’s response, too, can harden the regional atmosphere.
Southeast Asia – Trust, however with out bloc politics
Japan nonetheless enjoys a excessive degree of belief in Southeast Asia. The Straits Times has described deeper ties with ASEAN as a type of “enlightened self-interest”: strengthening regional resilience additionally protects Japanese provide chains.[13]
The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, nonetheless, factors to an necessary reservation. Japan’s army strengthening will not be essentially rejected; it might turn into problematic if it have been too confrontational, marginalized ASEAN or pushed the area towards bloc politics.[14] Many international locations seem to need not merely a “stronger” Japan, however one which expands their room for selection.
Six views, six completely different standards
Saying that “positive” and “negative” assessments of Takaichi coexist overseas explains little. In the United States, the main target is on allied functionality and autonomy; in Europe, on the transformation of postwar Japan’s identification; in Australia, on the capability to assist maintain regional order; in South Korea, on separating historic disputes from sensible cooperation; in Chinese media, on Tokyo’s distance from the normal political basis of bilateral relations; and in Southeast Asia, on whether or not a stronger Japan widens or narrows different international locations’ decisions.
Can we actually measure these six readings by the identical yardstick? Probably not: they embody six completely different standards of “good diplomacy”.
At least within the sensible administration of overseas coverage, Takaichi is starting to maneuver past the preliminary picture of a easy “Abe heir” and “anti-China hawk”. She stays robust towards Beijing, however doesn’t mechanically comply with Washington; she cooperates pragmatically with Seoul and is broadening ties with Australia and Southeast Asia.
It would nonetheless be untimely to name all this “strategic autonomy”. For now, there are glimpses of a search: preserving the U.S. alliance because the central axis whereas thickening different relationships with a purpose to widen Japan’s room for motion.
Will that search evolve towards higher autonomy throughout the alliance, or primarily reinforce a U.S.-centered safety community? It continues to be too early to reply.
One query subsequently stays: what’s lacking from this map? Having clarified the factors utilized by the foremost media, we are able to transfer to the subsequent stage: bringing into view what has been ignored.
Notes and sources:
Source: Pressenza