Erdem Lamazhapov
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Feb 17 2026
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President Donald Trumps renewed bid to accumulate Kalaallit Nunaat, also called Greenland, just isn’t adequately defined by the rapid advantages that possession of this nation would give to the United States. Instead, this disaster is best defined when it comes to the Trump administrations political mission, which seeks to reinvent the United States id as a fantastic energy in an rising post-rules-based worldwide order. During his Davos speech, US President Donald Trumpreaffirmedhis want to accumulate Kalaallit Nunaat, citing that the US is a superb energy, a lot higher than individuals even perceive. Trump additionally underscored that the US wanted Greenland as a result of it is part of North America, on the northern frontier of the Western Hemisphere, which is a core nationwide safety curiosity of the United States of America. Trump reaffirmed the identical safety logic that was introduced a number of months earlier, within the Trump administrations November 2025 National Security Strategy which proclaimed all the Western Hemisphere because the US sphere of affect underneath a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (White House 2025, 5). Just a number of weeks later, the Trump administration intervened in Venezuela. The Trump administrations sphere of affect discourse just isn’t an epiphenomenon however the driver of the US newfound expansionism within the Arctic.
This article will first study Greenlands significance for the US within the context of the countrys colonial previous and evolving political standing. Then, it’s going to argue that narrowly instrumental materialist explanations about safety, assets, and China/Russia affect are unsatisfying. Instead, it’s going to advance an interpretation of Trumps Greenland marketing campaign as a mission of sphereofinfluence constructing and home legitimacy, drawing on IR literature on worldwide standing and state mythmaking. Finally, it’s going to take into account what the creating saga round Greenland means for Greenlands future and for the way forward for the worldwide order.
Greenlands colonial legacy and the United States
Kalaallit Nunaat, or Greenland, is an autonomous nation throughout the Kingdom of Denmark situated on the worlds largest island with an space of ca. 2.2 millionkm (836,330 sq mi). The disaster unfolding round Greenland is inseparable from its colonial previous and current. Through the colonial gaze, the islands worth lies in its territory and its assets: its vastness, sparseness, and strategic location between the North American and European continents. It overlooks the truth that the nation is house to 57,000 Greenlanders, nearly all of whom are Indigenous Inuit. Paleo-Inuit populations have been the primary people to reach in Greenland round 2500 BCE, whereas the ancestors of the fashionable Inuit got here to the island within the thirteenth century. Like the remainder of the Arctic, Greenland was colonized by a European energy; on this case, Denmark established management within the 18th century.
The US designs on Greenland aren’t new. As a part of the North American continent, Greenland falls underneath the Monroe Doctrine, an American precept first declared in 1823 that said the US wouldn’t tolerate European powers establishing new colonies within the Western Hemisphere. It was solely on the finish of the nineteenth century that the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted as an expansionist and exclusionist precept used to justify American interventionism and in the end empire, paving the way in which for the popularity of the US as a fantastic energy (Murray 2019, 147). The unique 1823 formulation didn’t envisage the Arctic explicitly. In the nineteenth century, US Secretary of State Seward, who negotiated the Alaska Purchase in 1867, dreamt of annexing Greenland and Iceland to the younger American empire and started negotiations to buy them from Denmark. A State Departmentreportconcluded in 1868 that the US can buy Iceland and Greenland, however particularly the latter for the political and business causes. Back then, as in the present day, the necessity to purchase Greenland was motivated by a hostile exterior nice energy: the United Kingdom.
The United States continued to entertain an concept of colonizing components of Greenland underneath the precept of efficient occupation, however finallyrecognizedDanish sovereignty over Greenland in 1916 after the United States bought the Danish West Indies (the Virgin Islands). Just days after Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany throughout World War II, U.S. senators thought-about the concept of buying the island once more, with extra radical voices advocating outright annexationbut the concept that the United States would illegally use army power to broaden its borders into an already occupied Denmark was out of the query. Instead, the United States, with the permission of Danish Minister Kauffmann, occupied the island protectively, whereas recognizing it as a Danish colony. The US relinquished management of Greenland following the liberation of Denmark, however American bases remained on the island per the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement, because the island successfully remained part of the US and North American safety structure by way of NATO.
The acquisition of Greenland just isn’t about slender materials pursuits
The US renewed declare to Greenland is an try to re-establish a sphere of affect slightly than a standard territorial seize for army bases or assets. Trumps Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine requires American preeminence within the Western Hemisphere and seeks to disclaim non-Hemispheric rivals the power to place forces or different threatening capabilities, or to personal or management strategically important property. This is available in sharp distinction with the earlier US coverage, which actively sought to counter Russian designs on a sphere of affect in Eurasia (Ferguson and Hast 2018). This change just isn’t merely rhetorical; it’s a normative declare that the US has a proper to unique affect within the Western Hemisphere. As Hedley Bull (2002) argued, spheres of affect are acknowledged not simply as a matter of truth, but additionally as a matter of proper: the truth that different international locations acknowledge a sphere of affect doesn’t imply that they settle for it as official. It was the US coverage to not acknowledge different international locations spheres of affect, nor to declare its personal sphere of affect explicitly. Before the primary Trump administration (2017-2021), the US calmly noticed Chinese investments in Panama and evenhelped dealerChinas admission because the Arctic Council observer state in 2013. In response to the beginning of the Russian struggle towards Ukraine in 2014, President Obamastatedthat the times of empire and spheres of affect are over and that larger nations should not be allowed to bully the small or impose their will on the barrel of a gun. This modified already in 2019, when Trump for the primary timeproposedto buy Greenland from Denmark in a big actual property deal, arguing that strategically, for the United States, it could be good.
First, the acquisition of Greenland in the way in which proposed by President Trump just isn’t obligatory to reinforce the safety of the United States. Despite Donald Trumps assurances that the US wants possession of Greenland for strategic nationwide safety and worldwide safety, Greenlands protection just isn’t at present a army concern. Greenlands location is certainly strategically essential, however the US doesn’t stand to realize something new by buying possession of the nation. Greenland is essential for the US to observe house and air actions (potential missile launches), in addition to submarines and different actions at sea by way of the GIUK hole (Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain). However, the US can already meet its wants by way of NATO. Greenland is already deeply built-in throughout the North American safety structure by way of NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). It was the US itself that selected to shut its bases in Greenland in 2003 and later reopened one in 2020 because the Pituffik Space Base. The present administration has emphasised that its curiosity in Greenland has to do with the development of a Golden Dome, however with regards to surveillance and homeland protection, there’s nonetheless room for maneuver for the US to broaden its presence by way of current frameworks. Trumps former vice-president, Mike Pence,summed upthe scenario thusly: Greenland is enormously essential to us and our nationwide safety. But the truth that we have already got two army bases there and the power to barter additional is greater than sufficient for us to fulfill that want.
Second, assets aren’t the explanation that the US is fascinated about Greenland. Many speculate that Greenland is essential to the US due to its wealthy pure assets, particularly uncommon earth parts. In a Senate listening to, Ted Cruzsaidthat [I]f the U.S. have been to realize entry to Greenlands assets, it might considerably cut back our dependence on international suppliers, significantly China, which at present operates a digital monopoly on the uncommon earth market. This motivation wasdeniedby Trump himself, who posited that to get to this uncommon earth, you must undergo a whole bunch of ft of ice and it isn’t the explanation we’d like it. Rare earth parts, certainly, are thought-about important minerals within the US. China controls massive components of the uncommon earth worth chain. There are two recognized deposits in Greenland, each in South Greenland. One is the Kvanefjeld deposit, which additionally incorporates uranium. In 2021, Greenland handed a legislation prohibiting uranium mining, attributable to considerations about soil and water contamination. Radioactive waste have to be managed sustainably, which could be very demanding. At the identical time, this residue is among the largest recognized deposits of uncommon earths, with a comparatively excessive focus. There can also be one other deposit, the so-called Kringlerne deposit, which is managed by a US-backed mining firm, Tanbreez. The Kringlerne deposit just isn’t radioactive, and Tanbreez is making ready to start out mining.
Third, an argument has been made that buying Greenland would permit the US to take care of the strategic problem that China and Russia current to the United States within the Arctic. Trump argues that Greenland sits undefended in a key strategic location between the United States, Russia, and China. Further, the argument relies on Trumps declare that there have been Russian and Chinese shipsall over the placearound Greenland. A model of this argument firstappearedin a speech by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo throughout a gathering of the Arctic Council at a time when there have been precise Chinese proposals for a Polar Silk Road. However, the Polar Silk Road has been placed on ice following Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Lamazhapov et al. 2023), and the final time a Chinese analysis icebreaker operated close to Greenland was in 2018. Furthermore, it has beenreportedthat Nordic diplomats with NATO safety clearance reject that there have been indicators of Russian or Chinese ships or submarines round Greenland. Likewise, experiences of Russian and Chinese ships round Greenland weredeniedby the Commander of Denmarks Joint Arctic Command,as nicely asby Greenlands Premier Jens-Frederik Nielsen. China has certainly expanded its presence within the Arctic, however a lot of it revolves round epistemic, not bodily presence (Eiterjord 2024). This epistemic presence revolves across the manufacturing of scientific, cartographic and authorized data in regards to the Arctic, which in flip permits China to realize a distant entry to the area (Bennett and Eiterjord 2023).
Russian and Chinese presence in Greenland matches the definition of what Snyder (1991, 80) calls strategic myths, or promiscuous, hydra-headed rationales that justify enlargement, typically sincerely believed, but additionally typically overselling threats and advantages. The fable just isn’t the presence of Russia and China itself, and even the risk they pose the parable is that the one coverage reply is an outsized necessity for enlargement that overstates the threats and advantages. Even if the US have been to acquire sovereignty over Greenland, the USs historically broad studying of the liberty of navigation underneath the legislation of the ocean wouldn’t give the US a lot room to regulate the presence of different states vessels in waters round Greenland. Furthermore, all makes an attempt by numerous Chinese actors to ascertain themselves in Greenland have come to nought. Chinese firms that invested in Greenlandic mines in the end confronted a number of hurdles attributable to US, Danish, and Greenlandic considerations, which prompted Chinese traders to tug again or chorus from investing in Greenland (Andersson and Zeuthen 2024). Likewise, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) withdrew its bid for creating airports in Greenland after Copenhagen declared this might give China details about important infrastructure and stepped as much as finance the development of the airports (Shi and Lanteigne 2019).
The Bering Strait supplies a pure chokepoint for monitoring Chinese energy projection into the Arctic. If the US have been actually involved about Chinese presence within the Arctic area, then there can be extra dialogue of the elevated scope of Sino-Russian exercise close to the coast of Alaska. Both international locations have elevated their joint workouts within the Bering Strait area. Already, the primary Trump administration gave funds to assemble Coast Guard icebreakers, however the US didn’t ship them. But after the Trump administration slashed science funding, the US National Science Foundation really misplaced the lease for its solely analysis icebreaker in 2025. In the meantime, China performed its largest Arctic expedition north of Alaska, that includes 4 analysis icebreakers. I’ve beforehand argued that for China, these expeditions and even army workouts have a status-seeking significance (Lamazhapov 2025; Lamazhapov and sthagen 2025). If the Greenland disaster actually revolved round strategic considerations, the Bering Strait can be essentially the most pure place to start out. To be clear, the absence of a extra assertive posture within the Bering Strait area just isn’t proof that safety considerations are irrelevant, however muted response to tangible SinoRussian exercise close to Alaska and the hyperbolic rhetoric surrounding Greenland signifies that the island occupies a particular symbolic place within the administrations geopolitical creativeness.
The similar logic about excluding Chinese affect applies to Iceland. Apart from occasional think-tankreports, there’s at present little dialogue of Icelands position in US protection methods. In truth, China and Iceland preserve science cooperation and China even operates a analysis observatory there (Ingvarsdttir and Hauksdttir 2024). However, the US has not referred to as for annexation of the nation, regardless of it having the identical safety place as Greenland. Instead, the US has chosen a sober technique of a continued bilateral safety partnership. Iceland has not but been included within the US sphere of affect, and the US has not made any strikes to realize sovereignty over the nation.
Taken collectively, these safety and resourcebased explanations undergo from an issue of poor necessity: they can’t account for the depth of the administrations rhetoric, nor for its insistence onownership versus continued entry. If the US safety pursuits are already nicely served by the present preparations, what explains Trumps latest push to personal the island? The 202526 marketing campaign to personal Greenland is finest learn as a transfer that reintroduces spheres of affect as a component structuring the geographies of house and remaps American id in a postrules-based order. As Murray (2019) has argued, the institution of a sphere of affect isn’t just about safety politics, but additionally considerations worldwide standing. Moreover, in response to Pu Xiaoyu (2019, 27), states typically go to nice lengths of their want for worldwide standing and status, and readily pay materials prices, particularly attributable to a home political wrestle for legitimacy. Otherwise mentioned, as Jack Snyder (1991, 20) holds, among the many nice powers, home pressures typically outweigh worldwide ones within the calculations of nationwide leaders. Indeed, Snyders evaluation signifies that always the home legitimacy disaster is so grave that long-run international coverage penalties have to be disregarded.
Greenlands symbolic worth for the US
Snyder (1991) argues that nice powers repeatedly persuade themselves that safety requires enlargement, and that this perception is a fable produced and sustained by home politics, not an goal necessity. As Snyder notes, home pressures typically outweigh worldwide ones within the calculations of nationwide leaders (20) and contending bureaucracies, army factions, or curiosity teams can, by way of coalition logrolling, generate expansionist insurance policies extra overcommitted than any of the curiosity teams sought individually. (41). The success of this mythmaking depends upon securing help of key coalition gamers by making concessions, and, apart from Trumps personal political motion, Make America Great Again (MAGA), not many different political teams appear to be satisfied. The rhetorical emphasis has thus been on what possession of Greenland might convey them: concentrated and sustained effort oncountering Chinafor China-hawks, moreinvestmentinto protection for the military-industrial complicated, anautarkic useful resource basefor traders, and even alibertarian tech hubfor the Silicon Valley.
For MAGA, re-establishing a sphere of affect is a transfer that might enact American greatness. Vice-President J.D. Vances go to to Greenland in April 2025featuredin the White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitts MAGA Minute as historic. Trumps uncompromising stance throughout negotiations is a direct response to the USs perceived weak point underneath the Obama and Biden administrations. Some RepublicanscriticizedObamas strategy to diplomacy as an indication of weak point, dubbing it Obamas apology tour. In distinction, Trumps political picture seeks to mission an unapologetic and assertive United States. The want for enhancement of the US worldwide standing and a heavy-handed international coverage just isn’t new among the many Republican voters. The worry of showing weak partially helps to elucidate why the administration not solely refused to rule out army means to acquire Greenland till Davos but additionally threatened retaliation within the type of tariffs to NATO allies for sending troops to Greenland. US rhetoric is a method of reaching credible political results, the place the one credible measure of sovereignty is an entire deference by NATO allies.
In this case, there are many home incentives to dramatize American greatness by way of territorial enlargement (over Greenland), which outweigh purely rational assessments of strategic necessity. In specific, increasing US territory might certainly ameliorate Trumps legitimacy considerations. Trump received the presidency in 2016 however misplaced the favored vote, which contributed to some uneasiness round Trumps first presidency. Though Trump received the favored vote in 2024, his presidency was marred by the legacy of the January 6 assaults on the Capitol. At the time when he was sworn into workplace for a second time, Trumps web approval ratingwas11 factors decrease than that of Biden on the time of the latters inauguration. The complete second time period thus far has been marked with wide-scale protests, such because the No Kings protests and protests towards ICE. In addition to this, Trumps personal MAGA campwent througha high-profile break up.
The acquisition of Greenland might work as a legitimacy booster as a result of it mobilizes robust imaginaries of frontier and exploration related to American exceptionalism. Donald TrumpproclaimedOctober 9, 2025 as Leif Erikson Day, celebrating him as the primary European to ever set foot within the New World who travelled to America by way of Greenland and because the forefather of the American story from the pioneers who tamed the Western frontier to the Apollo 11 astronauts who proudly planted the Stars and Stripes on the Moon. This revitalization of American id hopes to strengthen the home legitimacy of the administration. It builds upon the discourse of manifest future to ascertain management over the North American continent and enclose the frontier. As Campbell (2008) writes, the frontier is a strong and recurring picture in American political discourse, certainly, the structure and regeneration of the id of the European-American self has been made doable by the enactment of violence upon the Indian different. In this script, Inuit and Danish claims grow to be background noise to an primarily US story of exploration and future. In this narrative, the erasure of Indigenous sovereignty comes with a promise of regeneration by way of domination.
Though the need to instigate a disaster round Greenland might need been motivated by the Trump administrations want to reinforce its worldwide standing and legitimacy, it doesn’t preclude that Trump just isn’t honest in believing that this US expansionist rhetoric is a defensive one. Indeed, as Snyder (1991) observes, it’s typically the case that state mythmakers by some means come to consider their very own propaganda. The push to accumulate Greenland was foregrounded by the US securitization of Chinese efforts to ascertain a foothold within the Arctic.
Re-centering Kalaallit Nunaat
Adding urgency to the present disaster is the host of US anxieties about Greenlands potential slippage from the US sphere of affect. Kalaallit Nunaat just isn’t a passive object of nice energy competitors however is an actor in its personal proper, and for the previous a number of many years Greenland has been taking incremental steps in direction of independence. In 1953, Greenland grew to become a constituent nation of the Kingdom of Denmark and gained illustration within the Danish Parliament. However, this didn’t cease the Danish states continued insurance policies disempowering the Indigenous inhabitants, together with tried experiments of pressured assimilation of Inuit kids and violations of the reproductive rights of Indigenous kids and ladies. This painful colonial previous varieties the background for the Greenlandic strikes in direction of full nationhood. Greenlanders efficiently achieved house rule in 1979. Greenland adopted its flag in 1985. In 2008, nearly all of Greenlanders voted to broaden their Self-Government, forcing Copenhagen to devolve competence over all points apart from protection and international coverage to the Greenlandic authorities underneath the 2009 Self-government legislation. Paragraph 21 of the legislation stipulates that the choice on Greenlandic independence is made by the Greenlandic individuals. Indeed, successive Greenlandic governments have made small however constant steps in direction of independence. For instance, as a part of its preparation for independence, Greenland established its personal diplomatic representations in essentially the most related diplomatic capitals: Copenhagen, Brussels, Washington DC, Reykjavik, and, since 2021, Beijing. Greenlanders have efficiently used US and Chinese pursuits to diversify companions and enhance bargaining leverage visvis Copenhagen (Gad et al. 2018; Jacobsen 2020).
However, the predicament during which Greenland finds itself in the present day reduces its room for maneuvering. In his tackle to Congress in 2025, TrumpaddressedGreenlanders by saying, [W]e strongly help your proper to find out your personal future, and if you happen to select, we welcome you into the United States of America One method or the opposite, have been going to get it. The want of the US to get forward of Greenlands independence primarily presents Greenland with a selection of freely accepting an affiliation with the US, nevertheless that may appear to be, or being given no say within the matter in any respect. This is absolutely in line with the textbook definition of a sphere of affect, which appears to underpin Trumps imaginative and prescient for the post-rules-based order, which additionally consists of unique membership governance establishments just like the Board of Peace.
I’ve argued that the Trump administrations push to personal Kalaallit Nunaat just isn’t pushed by particular safety or useful resource wants, however slightly by the idea that the island ought to naturally fall throughout the United States sphere of affect. This is to not say that Greenland is unimportant to US safety. Greenland is certainly essential to the US safety wants, and people are largely met by way of current preparations.
More broadly, the episode alerts a deeper transformation of the worldwide order. The liberal worldwide order, which, with all of its quite a few flaws, was underpinned by the spirit of cooperation, appears to be drawing to an finish. The United States was a steward and a supplier of public items, bringing relative prosperity to the US, the remainder of the West, and international locations like China, which loved a interval of peace and improvement that enabled its rise. In Arctic geopolitics, the temporary interval was generally known as Arctic exceptionalism, emphasizing that the Arctic area had robust and secure foundations for continued cooperation between Russia and the US regardless of disagreements elsewhere. As Snyder (1991, 1) argues, nice powers have a placing proclivity for selfinflicted wounds, and the US has already incurred vital reputational prices. It is a mistake to assume that the brand new post-rules-based world order will spell peril just for small nations like Kalaallit Nunaat.
References
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Further Reading on E-International Relations
- Postcolonial Gaslighting and Greenland: When Post-Truth Gets within the Way of Independence
- The Trump Corollary and the Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: The End of International Law?
- Opinion After Greenland, is French Guiana Americas Next Territorial Prize?
- The Emerging World Order within the twenty first Century: An English School Approach
- Opinion A New World Order? From a Liberal to a Post-Western Order
- Opinion Muslims as Sufferers within the Liberal World Order
About The Author(s)
ErdemLamazhapovis a PhD analysis fellow on the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and the University of Oslo. He haspublishedon the origins of Chinas Arctic coverage and explored how Chinas nice energy standing and ambitions influence its engagement with the Arctic area. His fundamental analysis pursuits are the connection between China and Russia, with a selected concentrate on the Arctic and associated areas such because the Polar Silk Road.
Editorial Credit(s)
Laura Innocenti
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Donald TrumpGreenlandLiberal Order