E-International Relations
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Dec 18 2025
Image by Ankit Panda
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow within the Nuclear Policy Program on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His analysis pursuits embody nuclear technique, escalation, missiles and missile protection, area safety, and U.S. alliances. He is the creator ofThe New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon(Polity, 2025),Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Risks(Carnegie, 2023), andKim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea(Hurst/Oxford, 2020). Panda is co-editor ofNew Approaches to Verifying and Monitoring North Koreas Nuclear Arsenal(Carnegie, 2021).
Panda has consulted for the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and his evaluation has been sought by U.S. Strategic Command, Space Command, and Indo-Pacific Command. Panda is among the many most extremely cited consultants worldwide on North Korean nuclear capabilities. He has testified on issues associated to South Korea and Japan earlier than the congressionally chartered U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Panda has additionally testified earlier than the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Before becoming a member of Carnegie, Panda was an adjunct senior fellow on the Federation of American Scientists and a journalist protecting worldwide safety. Panda is a frequent professional commentator in print and broadcast media around the globe on nuclear coverage and protection issues. He is editor-at-large at theDiplomat, the place he hosts theAsia Geopoliticspodcast, and a contributing editor atWar on the Rocks, the place he hostsThinking the Unthinkable With Ankit Panda, a podcast on nuclear issues.
Where do you see probably the most thrilling analysis or debates taking place in your subject at present?
There are a number of, however Ive been most enmeshed in two of late. The first issues the way forward for U.S. nuclear technique and power posture particularly, whether or not the United States ought to develop its nuclear arsenal past the degrees maintained over the previous decade. Since the tip of the Cold War, Washington has largely operated in an atmosphere of comparatively low nuclear threat. That notion is shifting. Many analysts now see a extra harmful panorama: a quickly increasing Chinese arsenal, a Russia waging typical warfare in Europe beneath the nuclear shadow, a longtime nuclear North Korea, and a fast-evolving technological context. In some methods, that is the newest iteration of a well-known query that has animated U.S. nuclear technique because the Cold War: how a lot is sufficient to guarantee credible deterrence? The subject stays unsettled. Policy decisions within the coming years will decide the path of U.S. nuclear posture, and even the choice to not develop capabilities, which I believe is unlikely given present debates in Washington, would carry important that means.
The second debate issues whether or not we’re on the verge of a brand new wave of nuclear proliferation. This query has grow to be particularly charged in 2025 with the inauguration of a second Trump administration. Growing doubts about U.S. reliability are prompting some non-nuclear allies to brazenly focus on the opportunity of growing their very own nuclear capabilities. In my latest work, Ivearguedthat a much less proliferated world stays far preferable, not just for U.S. pursuits but in addition for the safety of allies who could really feel more and more unsure beneath a mercurial American president. That stated, this debate is not going to disappear after the present administration. As one allied official just lately put it to me, the deeper subject revolves across the type of worldwide actor the United States aspires to be within the a long time forward.
How has the way in which you perceive the world modified over time, and what (or who) prompted probably the most important shifts in your pondering?
Well, the world has modified, and as an analyst I attempt to replace my views as new developments emerge. The largest shift for me, having spent a lot of my profession targeted on cooperative risk-reduction measures together with arms management, has been accepting that the 2020s merely dont seem conducive to such efforts taking maintain. I nonetheless imagine these concepts have long-term worth, however Im now equally targeted on contributing to coverage options which can be extra tractable within the close to time period.
In that sense, my pondering has developed: Ive realized to compartmentalise what may repay in the long term from what can meaningfully deal with todays challenges. This shift has been formed by ongoing debates and exchanges with friends and pals within the subject, all of whom affect my perspective in refined methods. Ive at all times discovered that type of friction productive; it sharpens concepts. Social media as soon as provided an area for that type of deliberation too, however sadly, thats not the case. That stated, my core values havent modified a lot.
Your latest e-book,The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon, argues we’re getting into a brand new period of nuclear competitors. From your view, what distinguishes this new nuclear age from earlier intervals of nuclear historical past?
The books core argument rests on the convergence of a number of important shifts within the world nuclear panorama that started, or sharply accelerated, across the begin of this decade. These embody the deterioration of relations among the many three nuclear-armed nice powers (the United States, Russia, and China), the collapse of a lot of the put upCold War arms management structure, the emergence of disruptive new applied sciences, and renewed pressures towards nuclear proliferation.
In brief, nuclear weapons have returned to the centre of world statecraft in methods not seen because the Cold War. Not every part about this new nuclear age is actually novel, many aged challenges have resurfaced (the U.S. pursuit of a Golden Dome, for instance), however the mixture of acquainted and unprecedented dynamics marks a real inflection level. It compels political leaders, navy planners, students, and the broader public alike to rethink how nuclear weapons form worldwide relations at present.
InKim Jong Un and the Bomb, you analyse how North Korea has constructed its nuclear arsenal to make sure regime survival. How profitable has Pyongyang been in creating a reputable deterrent, and what dangers does this pose for the broader area?
Looking again at what I stated above concerning the decisions dealing with the United States, North Korea faces its personal model of the how a lot is sufficient dilemma. Unlike Washington, Pyongyang seems to have concluded appropriately, in my opinion that even the demonstration of a considerably unreliable nuclear supply functionality towards the continental United States can produce significant deterrent results. Thats primarily the purpose North Korea reached in 2017.
Arms management has beenunder pressure, with main treaties collapsing and new ones proving tough to barter. Do you see any lifelike prospects for reviving arms management, or are we transferring towards an period of unconstrained competitors?
Its tough to argue that todays political, diplomatic, and technological fundamentals are pointing towards imminent breakthroughs in arms management. That stated, historical past reminds us that a few of the most vital advances on this space have emerged from surprising and harmful moments the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Soviet collapse being two outstanding examples.
The important prerequisite for significant arms management is mutual curiosity, and that’s largely absent at present. Still, I imagine its essential for our subject to proceed investing in analysis and concepts on arms management, verification, monitoring, and diplomacy. When political circumstances finally shift, and they’re going to, it will likely be important to have each the mental groundwork and sensible capability prepared. I dont know when that chance will come up, however its unbelievable that it’s going to by no means come.
Emerging applied sciences equivalent to hypersonic missiles, cyber instruments, and synthetic intelligence are sometimes described as destabilizing. Which of those do you assume pose the best problem to strategic stability, and why?
The reply is: it relies upon. The framework I typically use to consider this query focuses on the survivability of nuclear forces and command and management. The key query is whether or not a given expertise makes it simpler or more durable for a given nuclear state to safe its nuclear forces towards a primary strike. If it enhances survivability as with the appearance of naval nuclear propulsion and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the course of the Cold War it contributes to stability. If it undermines survivability for instance, by way of a hypothetical, extremely superior AI-enabled world monitoring system for cellular missiles and submarines it falls on the destabilising facet of the ledger. Much of this stays the topic of energetic debate, and a number of other rising applied sciences, equivalent to synthetic intelligence, could concurrently empower each the proverbial hiders and finders.
You havearguedthat nuclear dynamics in Asia differ from these within the Cold War U.S.Soviet context. What do Western analysts typically misunderstand once they apply Cold War frameworks to Asia?
Theres rather a lot to unpack, however the three main variations concern multipolarity, the absence of an built-in multilateral alliance construction, and geography.
First, the Indo-Pacific nuclear atmosphere is inherently multipolar. While its tempting to focus narrowly on U.S.China nuclear dynamics in a possible battle over Taiwan, one should additionally contemplate that North Korea represents an impartial centre of nuclear decision-making, one thing with no direct parallel in Cold War Europe. The closest historic analogue is perhaps how U.S. planners, after 1964, sought to include Red China into nuclear warfare plans that had been in any other case centred on the Soviet Union. Yet even that comparability falls brief: at present, American planners should deal with the opportunity of opportunistic or simultaneous campaigns by a number of adversaries within the area.
Second, regardless of Beijings complaints about Washington trying to construct an Asian NATO, the United States is nowhere near establishing such an alliance. Its treaty allies within the area don’t share an built-in command construction, not to mention a collective defence framework. This makes alliance administration essentially completely different, although not essentially extra complicated. Much of myrecent workhas targeted on how U.S. Indo-Pacific allies take into consideration escalation administration in potential nuclear eventualities, significantly as a number of pursue superior non-nuclear capabilities able to producing strategic results. South Korea stands out as a very attention-grabbing case right here.
Finally, the Indo-Pacifics huge maritime geography creates a theatre in contrast to the North Atlantic or Arctic-oriented competitors of the Cold War. A key problem lies within the United States capacity to maintain an intense typical battle throughout such an expansive area. That issue might, in flip, heighten the temptation to think about nuclear choices as a way of offsetting typical disadvantages, a logic not unfamiliar from sure Cold War dilemmas confronted by the United States and NATO in Europe.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been championed by many non-nuclear states. Do you see it having any sensible influence on nuclear coverage, or will it stay largely symbolic?
I believe the disarmament motion will persist for so long as nuclear weapons exist. Those who imagine that deterrence gives both a preferable or no less than the one possible solution to coexist with nuclear weapons must be lifelike about that.
As for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), I count on its position to stay largely symbolic. In sensible phrases, so long as its member states preserve a do-no-harm strategy towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the broader non-proliferation regime ought to stay steady.
What is crucial recommendation you might give to younger students of International Relations?
Read broadly and be prepared to vary your thoughts. The world ought to and can shock you.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
- Interview Melissa Conley Tyler
- Interview Frank Sauer
- Interview Sreeram Chaulia
- Interview Andrew Hom
- Interview Kishore Mahbubani
- Interview Tomohiko Taniguchi
Editorial Credit(s)
Tycho De Vriendt
Tags
Arms ManagementAsiaEmerging Applied sciencesNuclear DeterrenceNuclear ProliferationStrategic ResearchUnited States