With 90% of imported cooking gasoline operating by way of the Irancontrolled chokepoint and solely 15 days of storage, New Delhi is testing Baltic and Pacific routes
The liquefied petroleum gasoline (LPG) shortages that India faces because of the Middle East battle have highlighted the necessity to strengthen the resilience of the nation’s most politically delicate gasoline.
Data from thePetroleum Planning and Analysis Cell(PPAC) exhibits that LPG consumption reached 31.32million tonnes in 2024-25, whereas home manufacturing was 12.79million tonnes. This signifies that near 60% of demand was met by imports, most of which transit by way of the conflicthitStrait of Hormuz.
When flows by way of this hall had been disrupted, India’s LPG provide chain got here underneath rapid pressure. Arrivals fell sharply, March imports dropped to1.19 million tonnes, a 46% decline, triggering spillovers into the home financial system.
The authorities moved swiftly to prioritize family consumption whereas tightening provides to business, whilst restricted storage, barely2-3 weeksof demand, narrowed the response window. New Delhi simultaneouslyinvoked emergency measuresto maximize refinery LPG output, with home manufacturing rising by roughly40percentin early March and scrambled for cargoes from various suppliers such because the US and Norway.
In this reshuffle,Russia, already India’s largest crude provider, has emerged as a marginal LPG supply. The key constraints, nonetheless, are restricted volumes and complicated logistics.
India’s structural LPG dependence
India’sLPG importshave risen steadily, from 14.81million tonnes in 2019-20 to twenty.67million tonnes in 2024-25 following the enlargement of cleancooking entry and rising consumption. Over the identical interval,home productionhas remained broadly flat at round 12-13million tonnes, even asconsumptionincreased from 26.33million tonnes to 31.32million tonnes. As a consequence, imports have absorbed a lot of the incremental demand, pushing their share to round twothirds of complete consumption.
Efforts to diversify provide had been already underway earlier than the disaster, most notably by way of India’s longtermLPG provide settlement with the US, securing round 2-2.2million tonnes yearly from 2026. However, the present disruption exhibits that diversification stays partial and depends upon freight prices and vessel availability.
The disaster has additionally uncovered a weaker hyperlink in India’s LPG chain of restricted storage capability. PPAC’s latestLPG Profile Reportputs complete LPG tankage at about 1.2million tonnes, equal to roughly 15 days of nationwide demand. Bottling vegetation on common maintain solely round six days of stock, so even shortlived disruptions depart policymakers with little room for maneuver and rapidly amplify exterior shocks.
Russian routes: UstLuga, Vladivostok, and the NSR
Reports recommend that India more and more securesLPG cargoes from Russia and Japanas properly because the US. Given that India consumes2.6million tonnes of LPG a month, round 80,000-90,000 tonnes a day, even a number of various cargoes, sometimes 40,000-60,000 tonnes every, cowl just a few days of nationwide demand. Initial Russian and Japanese provides are subsequently strategic hedges, not gamechangers.
But diversifying suppliers shouldn’t be the identical as diversifying routes. That is why Russia and longerrange corridors resembling theNorthern Sea Routeand the proposedChennai-Vladivostok maritime corridorhave entered the coverage debate as they provide route variety when the Middle East is on hearth.
On Russia’s aspect, the principle LPG export gateway is the Baltic port ofUstLuga, the place the Sibur terminal handles liquefied gasoline. In 2024-25, business stories indicated thatLPG exports from UstLugaroughly doubled yearonyear over January-May 2025 as European consumers retreated and exporters pivoted to Asia, and delivery intelligence famous at the very least two Indiabound cargoes totaling about 40,000 tonnes as soon as flows resumed.
Indian strategists see two broad corridors for these volumes. A western route runs from the Baltic or Black Sea by way of theMediterranean,Suez CanalandRed Seainto the Arabian Sea, bypassing Hormuz however including publicity atSuezandBabelMandeb; deliveries to Kochi, Mangaluru, or Jamnagar would take round 40 days or extra.
An jap route departs fromRussia’s Far East round Vladivostok, passes by way of the Sea of Japan, the East and South China seas, and theStrait of Malacca, after which throughout the Bay of Bengal to India’s east coast, reaching Haldia, Paradip, or Ennore in12-24 days. This hall concentrates danger in Malacca, crowded with container site visitors and mendacity underChinese naval shadow, nevertheless it suits India’s broader IndoPacific calculus if finally anchored in a proper Chennai-Vladivostok hyperlink.
For now, speak of theNorthern Sea Route as an power lifelineis extra formidable than a nearterm answer. Harsh ice situations, the small fleet oficeclass tankers and LNG carriers licensed for Arctic operations, excessive insurance coverage premiums, and sanctions on keyRussian Arctic oil and gasoline projectslimit the industrial viability of NSRbased LPG trades within the close to time period.
Even with document site visitors of about38million tonnes in 2024, complete NSR cargo continues to be a fraction of the a whole lot of hundreds of thousands of tonnes transferring by way of theSuez Canaleach 12 months, which is why most analysts see it as a distinct segment complement quite than a practical alternative for current routes.
Yet each capitals are clearly intent on maintaining theVladivostok-Chennai Eastern Maritime Corridoron the desk as an choice, with Indian ministers describing it as operational and highlighting its early function in carrying crude and different bulk cargoes between Russia’s Far East and India’s east coast.
Map is for illustrative functions solely.
RT / RT
Security premium, signaling and political calculus
Russia’s function as a swing provider is about redrawing danger, not changing the Gulf. India imported around20.67million tonnesof LPG in 2024-25, implying an import requirement of 1.7-1.9million tonnes per thirty days and leaving abroad provides to satisfy the majority of home demand. Even underneath optimistic assumptions, Russia’s incremental export capability can cowl solely a small share of this requirement, broadly similar to the eventual scale of India’s longterm LPG association with the United States, so various suppliers can buffer shocks however not substitute the Gulf.
The worth of Russian LPG subsequently lies in geography and signaling quite than quantity. Cargoes arriving by way of UstLuga by way of Suez, or by way of Vladivostok and Malacca, are by definitionnonHormuz flows, and even incremental nonGulf volumes shift India’s danger calculus when set in opposition to the rising share of crude now imported on routes that bypass Hormuz, as highlighted in recentshipping information and official statementson diversification. The query is whether or not NewDelhi pays a modest route premium for this safety, simply because it accepts further miles to faucet discounted Russian crude or proceed to fall again on crisistime improvisation.
There can also be a home political dimension. LPG is the flagship image of the federal government’scleancooking drive, and a chronic scarcity can be way more electorally damaging than a technical disruption in refinery crude runs. This is whyofficial communicationsduring the disaster have confused refinery output rampups and diversified sourcing, amplified by pictures ofVLGCs discharging LPGat Indian ports, alongsiderepeated assurancesthat individuals’s gasoline wants will probably be met.
For policymakers, the strategic alternative is how a lot to spend money on tanks at residence versus miles at sea, whether or not to broaden LPG storage or pay a premium for Russian and different nonHormuz cargoes, since Russia can not change the Gulf however, by way of routes from UstLuga by way of Suez and from Vladivostok by way of Malacca, does give NewDelhi a approach to recast provide danger past West Asia.
For Moscow, stepping in as a reliable swing provider, even at modest volumes, cements its picture in India as a longterm power companion quite than a crisistime outlier.
(RT.com)